Equitable Doctrines
Conversion
Fletcher v Ashburner
Money directed toward the purchase of land and land directed to be sold, are regarded by equity as that species of property into which they are directed to be converted.
Steele v Steele (Ir CA)
Where a purchaser has contracted to sell lands which he later devises in his will, it entitles the devisee to the same estate in the purchase money.
Lawes v Bennett (Rolls)
If a man possesses real estate and enters a contract to sell it and dies before the contract is complete it is personal property to him.
Reconversion
Election
Sullivan v Sullivan (Ir CA)
The general principle of election is that where somebody takes a benefit under a will or other instrument, they must give full effect to the instrument under which they receive the benefit.
If the instrument purports to deal with something which it was beyond the power of the donor or settlor to dispose of, but to which effect can be given by the concurrence of the person benefitting, the law will impose on that person the duty to give that concurrence.
It is however, for that person alone to elect to receive the benefit or not.
Re Edwards (CA)
The essentials of election are:
there should be an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of certain property
the property should not in fact be the testator's own property
a benefit should be given by the will to the true owner of the property
Re Lord Chesham (Ch)
Election is based on the principle that a man should not be allowed to approbate and reprobate and that if he approbates he shall do all in his power to confirm the instrument which he approbates.
Wollaston v King (Eq)
The rule as to election applies as between a gift under the will and a claim dehors adverse to it – it does not apply as between two different clauses under the same will.
Sweetman v Sweetman (VC Court)
Conditions for holding a party bound to his choice election are:
he must know that the property, which the testator has chosen to give to another person, was not the testator's property and would upon the testator's decease belong to him
he must know the relative values of the properties between which he is to elect
he must know that the rule of equity exists and that he has to chose between the two estates
he must have made deliberate choice to exercise it
Satisfaction
Satisfaction of debts by legacies
Talbott v Shrewsbury (Ch)
If a debtor gives his creditor a legacy which exceeds the size of the debt it is to be taken as satisfaction of the debt.
However, if the legacy is given on a contingency the legacy will not be taken in satisfaction of the debt, even if the contingency occurs.
Buckley v Buckley
Given that the debt in this case was on a running account and the testator could not be presumed to know how much was outstanding on the account at the time of his death, he cannot be deemed to have intended the legacy in satisfaction of it without express words.
Re Keogh's Estate (Ch)
Allowing mortgagees to live on the mortgaged land after the mortgagor is not to be taken as satisfaction of the debt.
Satisfaction of portion debts by legacies
Glengall v Thynne
Equity leans in favour of a provision by will being in favour of a portion by contract, and unlike debts, a legacy can form part of the satisfaction for a portion.
Hickey v O'Dwyer (HC)
Satisfaction is the donation of a thing with the intention that it be taken in whole or in part satisfaction of some prior claim. The presumption of satisfaction traditionally has been applied where
the testator was father of, or in loco parentis to the donee
the first gift is a portion
both gifts are substantially of the same nature and in favour of the same person
The provision of the proceeds of a life insurance policy was a portion in the sense of being a gift of a substantial nature relative to the means of the testator, and the will provisions and the further trust in her name were substantially of the same nature.
Not having revoked the will nor exercising power of appointment under the trust gave rise to a presumption that the testator intended the fourth defendant to inherit.
Satisfaction of legacies by legacies
Re Armstrong (VC)
If a testator gives a legacy by will and in a subsequent testamentary disposition gives a legacy to the same person, the presumption is that they are cumulative.
Bell v Park (CA)
The above is simply a presumption and can be disproved by the express terms of the two instruments.
Satisfaction of legacies by portions
Re Pollock (CA)
Where a testator gives a legacy to a child, or any person in respect of whom he has assumed parental obligations, and afterwards makes a gift or enters into a binding contract in his lifetime in favour of the same legatee there is a presumption that both gifts were made to fulfil the same natural or moral obligation and thus the gift inter vivos is to be taken, in whole or in part as satisfaction for the legacy.
Pym v Locker (Ch)
A grandfather having placed himself in loco parentis to certain grandchildren, having given them certain sums by his will and having afterwards made settlements upon their respective marriages, the rule against double portions was held to apply.
However, given that the advancements were smaller than the legacies, they were in pro tanto satisfaction of the latter.
Ademption
Griffith v Bourke (Ch)
Where there is a gift in a will, of money or property, for an expressed object to which it is devotes by the testator, and there is afterwards a donation by the testator in his lifetime for the same object, the law presumes that he did...